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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Do the Utah cases, which prohibit retroactive modification of child 
support, require enforcement of a divorce decree's child support provisions in favor 
of a parent who relinquished custody and provided no support? Or, alternatively, 
does public policy prevent a parent who fails to support their child from recovering 
"back" child support from the parent who actually provided that support? Appellant 
suggests the standard of review is correctness, citing Dent v. Dent, 870 P.2d 280 
(Utah App. 1994). However, the proper standard of review of a trial court's decision 
regarding enforcement of a divorce decree is an abuse of discretion standard, which 
requires the reviewing court to "presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074, 1085 f 54 (Utah 2000) quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 
P.2d 530,534-35 (Utah 1984); see Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853,855- 856 (Utah 1984) 
(noting use of this standard in identical situation). 
2. Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevent Appellant from 
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collecting child support for Gentry Thompson from April 1992 until his emancipation 
in November 1997? The issue of equitable estoppel presents a mixed question of law 
and fact. The standard of review is broadened discretion. Trolley Square Assocs. v. 
Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App.1994) (citing Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993); State, Dept. of Human Services ex rel. 
Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997). 
3. Appellant suggests Judge Wilkinson erred in overruling the 
Commissioner in all respects, but did not properly brief the issue. The spreadsheet 
attached to Appellant's brief calculates compound interest on the balances, which was 
allowed by the commissioner, but correctly overruled by Judge Wilkinson. This is 
an issue of law and is reviewed for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 
P.2d421 (Utah App. 1994); Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 
177 (Utah App.1993). 
4. Do the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-4.4(2000) conflict with the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9.3(2000) ? If so which controls? Does it 
matter? In that the lower court was unaware of the statutory changes there is no 
standard of review per se; however, the issue presented is one of law reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4 Support follows the child. 
(1) Obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use 
and benefit of the child and shall follow the child. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in 
Section 78-45-2, when physical custody changes from that assumed in the original 
order, the parent without physical custody of a child shall be required to pay the 
amount of support determined in accordance with Sections 78-45-7.7 and 78-45-7.15, 
without the need to modify the order for: 
(a) the parent who has physical custody of the child; 
(b) a relative to whom physical custody of the child has been voluntarily given; 
or 
(c) the state when the child is residing outside of the home in the protective 
custody, temporary custody, or custody or care of the state or a state-licensed facility 
for at least 30 days. 
Added by 2000 Laws of Utah ch. 161, § 27, eff. May 1, 2000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9.3 Payment under child support 
order-Judgment. 
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on the 1st day of each 
3 
month for purposes of child support services pursuant to Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Part 
3, income withholding services pursuant to Part 4, and income withholding 
procedures pursuant to Part 5. 
(2) For purposes of child support services and income withholding pursuant to 
Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Part 3 and Part 4, child support is not considered past due until 
the 1 st day of the following month. For purposes other than those specified in 
Subsection (1) support shall be payable 1/2 by the 5th day of each month and 1/2 by 
the 20th day of that month, unless the order or decree provides for a different time for 
payment. 
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2, is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district 
court, except as provided in Subsection (4); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any other 
jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, 
except as provided in Subsection (4). 
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only 
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from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, 
or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. The tribunal shall order a judgment 
for the period from the service of the pleading until the final order of modification is 
entered for any difference in the original order and the modified amount. 
(5) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable 
domestic or foreign jurisdiction. 
(6) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to be effective and 
enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying on the 
public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with Sections 
78-22-1 and 62A-11-312.5. 
Amended by Laws 1989, c. 62; Laws 1989, c. 115; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 6, eff. July 
1,1997. Renumbered from § 30-3-10.6 and amended by Laws 2000, c. 161, § 33, eff. 
May 1, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Appellant, Laura Thompson ("Laura"), sought reimbursement of "back" child 
support from Appellee, Brent Thompson ("Brent"), for their minor children, Kelly 
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and Gentry Thompson. But for about five years, Gentry actually lived with Brent in 
Nevada. The trial court, Judge Wilkinson presiding, refused to enforce the child 
support order against Brent for that time period with respect to Gentry. Laura appeals 
that decision and the trial court's refusal to apply compound interest to the portion of 
the award that was made in her favor. 
Laura was divorced from Brent in 1981. She was awarded custody of and 
support for the parties' two children, Kelly and Gentry. Laura remarried at least once 
prior to 1992, ending alimony. In the late 1980!s, Brent relocated to Nevada. In April 
1992, Laura was pregnant and going through another divorce, so she sent Gentry to 
Las Vegas to live with his father. Although the parties differ on her original 
intention, there is no dispute that Laura thereafter provided no support for Gentry. 
He was educated in the schools of Nevada, participated in community programs in 
Nevada and was entirely supported by his father, Brent, in Nevada after April 1992. 
Laura made no attempt to have Gentry returned either through the Utah or 
Nevada Courts. Even though Gentry came regularly to Utah to visit his mother, she 
never sought to keep him here, but rather always returned him to his father in Nevada 
so that Brent could provide his support. 
B. Course of the Proceedings leading to the November 6, 1998 hearing: 
In August 1996, Laura filed an Order to Show Cause, seeking a judgment 
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against Brent for back child support in the amount of $87,918.66 (and $11,655 for 
past due alimony). Brent filed a response, which pointed to her multiple remarriages, 
disputed her claimed amounts and requested reimbursement of child support he had 
provided for Gentry, and asked to confirm his custody of Gentry. Laura did not 
contest custody or deny that Gentry had continuously lived and been supported in 
Nevada by his father since April 1992, but she did resist paying Brent child support 
for Gentry. In November 1998, Judge Wilkinson determined that Laura was owed 
an arrearage of $5,970.10 for the minor child, Kelly (who had been emancipated 
during the course of proceedings), and for Gentry while he lived with her. He denied 
Laura judgment for any support for Gentry after April 1, 1992. 
C. Course of the Proceedings leading to the Order of June 13, 2000: 
Following the November 1998 hearing, Brent pursued collection of child 
support due him for Gentry for the period from April 1992 through November 1997 
in the Nevada courts. The Nevada Court contacted the Utah "master" to confer about 
jurisdiction and denied Laura's motion to dismiss the proceedings against her. 
Ultimately, on October 26,1999, the Nevada court entered a judgment against Laura 
for child support due Brent for the time Gentry lived with him. Thereafter, on 
December 2, 1999 Laura requested a trial setting before Judge Wilkinson. 
Before the May 19,2000 pretrial could be held, Judge Wilkinson, sua sponte 
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telephoned counsel to inquire what remained to be tried. Both children had attained 
majority, there was no issue of custody and he had entered a judgment in February 
1999. (R. 584-586.) No transcript of that pretrial is available; however, counsel 
recalls that Judge Wilkinson was quite clear that there was no issue to be tried. He 
had already ruled. Laura's counsel then asked to prepare a final order for the court 
to sign and Judge Wilkinson agreed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Important facts have been omitted from Petitioner's (Laura's) statement of 
facts: 
1. In April 1992, Laura sent Gentry to live with his father in Nevada. Although 
Gentry returned on several occasions to visit her in Salt Lake City, Utah, he 
never returned to Utah to live permanently, nor did Laura make any attempt to 
enforce her custodial status. (R. 521-523.) 
2. From April 1992 until Gentry's emancipation (11/24/97), Brent was the de 
facto custodial parent. He provided all the support, care and nurturing for 
Gentry until his emancipation. (R. 527-528.) 
3- Laura totally relinquished her parental responsibilities and paid absolutely 
nothing toward the support of Gentry while he lived with his father. (Laura's 
answer to counterclaim, R. 425; R. 528, f 4.) 
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4. The parties do not dispute that from April 1992 through February 1998 Brent 
paid a total of $11,588.38 to Laura through the office of the Clark County 
District Attorney, which Judge Wilkinson credited to prior arrears in addition 
to providing the total ongoing support for Gentry directly. (R. 497- 501.) 
5. Judge Wilkinson entered a judgment in favor of Laura for child support arrears 
and interest through December 1,1998 in the amount of $5,970.10. A portion 
of the spreadsheet computation of those arrears in found at R. 555. Ex. "A" is 
a copy of the entire schedule. 
6. Judge Wilkinson did not address reimbursement of child support owed to Brent 
for Gentry for the time he lived with his father in Nevada. (R. 558-559.) 
7. The Order was finally signed and entered in February 1999. (R.553-555, 558-
559.) 
8. Following the November hearing, Brent filed an action against Laura in 
Nevada for reimbursement of Gentry's child support. Laura was served, 
entered an appearance, moved the Nevada Court to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds, participated in those proceedings by providing her income 
information and otherwise sought the protection of the courts of Nevada. A 
judgment was entered against her on October 26, 1999. (R. 573-576.) 
9. When Laura sought a trial before Judge Wilkinson (R568), Brent suggested 
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that the matter was moot ( R. 570), attaching a copy of the Nevada Judgment 
in his favor against Laura. ( R. 573-576 .) 
10. On May 9, 2000, Judge Wilkinson sua sponte telephoned counsel to inquire 
why this matter was set for trial. Since he had entered a child support 
judgment over a year previously and the children were both emancipated, he 
considered that to be a final resolution. (R. 586.) After discussion, it was 
agreed that a rule 54(b) order should be prepared by Laura's counsel to enable 
her to appeal the Court's prior ruling. No transcript of that telephone 
conference has been prepared. (R. 586-587.) 
11. Laura argues that she is entitled to a judgment against Brent for $150.00 per 
month child support for the support of Gentry from April 1992 through 
November 1996. (Appellant's Brief 12.) 
12. Laura admits Gentry lived with and was supported by Brent during the period 
for which she seeks child support. (R.528;) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The only Utah case that is directly on point refutes Laura's position. Utah case 
law provides that the trial court should not simply enforce a child support order 
without regard to whether the party requesting back child support actually provided 
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support in the first place. Rather, the court should consider the entirety of the 
circumstances and its determination should be based on equity. 
Laura fails to distinguish between ongoing support and past due support1. 
During the relevant period, Brent actually provided the ongoing support. Thus, Laura 
had no right to reimbursement from Brent. Laura's recitation of authority is not on 
point and misapprehends the rationale behind awards for child support 
reimbursement. Laura cites cases that involve parties who requested retroactive 
changes in the support order when they had actually provided support. In each case, 
the court was asked to retroactively impose child support against a party after a 
change of custody that was not accompanied by a changed support order. Had Brent 
been awarded support retroactively by Judge Wilkinson, those cases might be on 
point. Judge Wilkinson chose not to do so and Laura's cases are inapposite. 
Gentry lived with Brent from April 1992 until his emancipation. Gentry was 
owed the duty of ongoing support, not Laura. From and after April 1992 Brent met 
that need and fulfilled the obligation owed to Gentry. Laura provided no support. 
One must provide support in order to be entitled to reimbursement. Utah Code Ann. 
1
 "Current and ongoing support belongs to the child and cannot be bartered 
away or assigned. However, a claim for past-due child support creates a right to 
reimbursement which belongs exclusively to the person who provided the support." State 
By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah 
1996) (emphasis supplied). 
11 
§78-45-4.4 (2000) "Support follows the child" codified this common law principle. 
Laura argues that Brent did not prove the elements of estoppel. Judge 
Wilkinson found that the admitted facts supported estoppel; however, Laura failed 
to marshal the evidence which supported Judge Wilkinson's ruling. In 26 pages of 
Appellant's brief Laura fails to mention that she paid nothing to support her son after 
April 1992. Nor is there reference to the fact that Brent was his sole support during 
that time period. The only factual matter that Laura marshaled was that she sent 
Gentry to Nevada to live with Brent. Those facts were all critical to Judge Wilkinson 
and to the elements of equitable estoppel. 
Laura argues that Judge Wilkinson erred in not awarding her compound 
interest, but she is wrong. In addition, Laura bases her arguments on a procedural 
statute which conflicts with a later enacted provision which is controlling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Laura provided no support for Gentry after March 1992, 
thus there is no right to reimbursement. 
Laura asks this Court (and the trial court before) to slavishly enforce the words 
of the original decree and ignore the fact that she did not support Gentry during the 
time in question. But the law does not require that inequitable result; indeed, the law 
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is to the contrary. In determining whether to enforce a request for child support 
reimbursement, the court should make such adjustments as equity may require -
including simply refusing to enforce the order. Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 
1984). In Shaw, the mother was also granted custody of all the children in the divorce 
and several years later, one of the sons moved in with the father. The mother later 
claimed the father owed her back child support for the time the son lived with the 
father. She argued that before the son had moved, she and her new husband had made 
arrangements to purchase a home large enough for all the children. Thus, she 
reasoned she was entitled to that support to help pay for the home. 
The trial court disagreed and refused to enforce the support for time the son 
lived with his father. Shaw, 682 P.2d at 855 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court 
upheld, reasoning: 
in matters concerning custody and support of children, because of their 
highly equitable nature, it is appropriate for the trial court to take into 
consideration the entire circumstances in making any order of 
enforcement of the decree,... having in mind his equitable powers, to 
make any adjustments he may think fair and justified. 
Shaw, 682 P.2d at 856 (Utah 19884) (emphasis added, quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 
30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010,1014 (1974) rev 'don other grounds 421 U.S. 7). In 
Shaw, the Utah Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard, noting 
reversal would be inappropriate unless the evidence clearly showed the trial court 
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erred or abused its discretion. Shaw, 682 P.2d at 856 (1984) citing Openshaw 
v.Openshaw, 69 P.2d 177 (Utah 1981). 
Here, even more so than in Shaw, there is no evidence that Judge Wilkinson 
abused his discretion in refusing to order the enforcement of child support for the 
time in question. In both cases, the father actually provided support. But here, it is 
undisputed that it was Laura who sent Gentry to live with Brent. And, at least in 
Shaw, the mother claimed she had relied on the child support amount when she 
obligated herself on a new home purchase. Laura doesn't even claim that much and 
the analysis in Shaw applies with even more force here. See DeBry v. Noble 889 P.2d 
428, 444, (Utah 1995) (this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper 
grounds, whether relied on by the trial court or not). 
Although unstated in Shaw, the reason the trial court should consider all the 
circumstances in determining whether to enforce child support provisions under these 
types of circumstances is to avoid grossly inequitable results. This is paralleled by 
Utah case law providing that ongoing support belongs to the child, but the right to 
reimbursement of support belongs to the one who actually provided support. State 
By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 886 
(Utah 1996). 
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But Laura's argument is based on the faulty premise that simply because the 
decree of divorce imposed a child support obligation on Brent, she is entitled to the 
amount of support she would have received for Gentry had he actually lived with her 
after April 1992. Laura completely ignores her obligation of support, and claims she 
is entitled to reimbursement for support she never provided. More astoundingly, she 
requests reimbursement for support she never provided from the very person who did' 
provide for Gentry's support. That is not, cannot and should never be the law in 
Utah. See Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984) (refusing to order payment of 
back child support under identical circumstances). 
When parents divorce, the custodial parent is obligated to physically provide 
all the necessities of life for the child; The non-custodial parent is obligated to 
contribute money in order to partially reimburse the custodian. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-45-1 et seq.(\99%)\ see id. §§ 78-45-3, -4 (duty man and woman to support child). 
The concept is, for example, when the custodian buys a pair of shoes for the child, 
the non-custodian contributes a fair share of the cost of those shoes. 
When the trial court enters its decree and orders the non-custodian to pay child 
support, it is paid to the custodian on behalf of the child for the purpose of enabling 
the custodian to physically provide for the child's necessities. If the obligor parent 
fails to pay, the children's needs still have to be met and it falls to the custodian to do 
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so. When that happens, the party actually providing the necessities is entitled to 
reimbursement. But, for the time in question, Laura did not provide the support, 
Brent did. 
Utah Courts long ago recognized that ongoing child support belongs to the 
child. "Current and ongoing support belongs to the child and cannot be bartered 
away or assigned." Dept. of Social Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah 1996) 
citing Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974). The right of reimbursement 
for past due child support conversely is owed to the person who actually supported 
the child. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah 1996). 
This conceptual separation of "reimbursement" and "child support" recognizes 
the hard realities. Genuine child support must be available to meet the current 
needs of the child, and payments made later cannot alter the level of support 
that the children have already received. 
Dept. of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676,680 (Utah 1997) 
Thus, when Laura asked Judge Wilkinson to award her child support for Gentry 
for the time period after April 1992, she was seeking reimbursement of support she 
had never provided. In Baggs, (supra), the Supreme Court explained the distinction 
between current support and past due child support. Current support is owed to the 
child, but past due support is owed to the person who actually supported the child: 
"This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support; and it is 
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subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same manner as any 
other debt." Baggs, 528 P.2d at 143. When, as here, the person who is legally 
obligated to support the child (Laura) fails to do so because of a de facto change of 
physical custody, and the de facto custodian (Brent) fulfills that obligation, the legal 
custodian is not entitled to seek reimbursement of support she never provided. The 
Utah legislature recently codified this concept and changed the law so that child 
support statutorily follows the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4.2 (Addressed 
infra.) 
II. 
Laura is estopped from seeking reimbursement 
2
 (1) Obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use 
and benefit of the child and shall follow the child. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 
78-45-2, when physical custody changes from that assumed in the original order, the parent 
without physical custody of a child shall be required to pay the amount of suppot 
determined in accordance with Sections 78-45-7.7 and 78-45-7.15, without the need to 
modify the order for: 
(a) the parent who has physical custody of the child; 
(b) a relative to whom physical custody of the child has been voluntarily given; or 
(c) the state when the child is residing outside of the home in the protective custody, 
temporary custody, or custody or care of the state or a state-licensed facility for at least 30 
days. 
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The trial court found that the admitted facts of the case established the defense 
of equitable estoppel. (R. 587.) Laura admits that Gentry lived with his father from 
April 1992 through his emancipation. (R. 425.) Laura admits she sent Gentry to live 
with his father because she was pregnant and going through a difficult divorce. (R. 
504, %&.) Laura never disputed the fact that she never contributed to Gentry's support 
after April 1992, as outlined in Brent's objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation. (R.528, %4.) 
Laura argues in her brief that Brent has demonstrated none of the elements of 
estoppel. (Appellant's Brief p. 20.) There was, however, ample evidence by way of 
factual admissions from which Judge Wilkinson could conclude as a factual matter 
that the elements of estoppel had been met. Those elements are: 
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act. 
Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997). 
First - Laura admitted to Judge Wilkinson that she sent Gentry to live with his 
father; that Brent was Gentry's sole means of support; and, that Gentry lived with his 
father until he became emancipated. While she chose to put her own spin on things, 
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claiming the change was only intended to be temporary, she made no claim that she 
did anything to regain her custodial status, nor did she claim to have supported 
Gentry. From Laura's admitted acts, Judge Wilkinson could, and apparently did 
conclude, that sending gentry to Nevada to live with and be supported by his father 
was inconsistent with her later claim for child support reimbursement. 
Second - Because Laura sent Gentry to Las Vegas, Brent necessarily took over 
Laura's former responsibilities. He enrolled Gentry in school in Nevada, he provided 
shelter and sustenance. He provided "genuine support" for Gentry in the sense that 
he, with no help from Laura, provided for Gentry's daily needs. Brent acted upon 
Laura's sending Gentry to live with him. Laura in her brief claimed that Brent had 
not been paying to support Gentry prior to April 1992, but surely she makes no such 
claim after 1992. 
Third - Brent did so without seeking a Court order changing custody or 
charging Laura with the duty of support. If Laura is awarded a judgment for 
reimbursement for the very support Brent provided to Gentry, it will be greatly to his 
detriment to have done so. The result Laura seeks is in effect a double assessment, 
i.e. Brent will be injured by having to pay twice for Gentry's support during the 
period Gentry lived with him. 
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Ill 
Laura Has Failed to Marshal The Evidence to Attack 
the Court's Factual Finding of Estoppel. 
The trial court found twice that there was estoppel, which is a mixed issue of 
fact and law. Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 
1997). To challenge a factual finding on appeal, one must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's fact finding and then demonstrate why the finding is in 
error. Campbell v. Box Elder Co., 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(allocating burden to appellants to marshal evidence supporting a factual finding if 
attacking it on appeal); see Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 681 (Utah 1997) (noting the trial 
court's findings had evidentiary support, so the remaining task was to determine 
whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts). Laura has failed to 
canvas the record for admitted facts supporting Judge Wilkinson's ruling and then 
demonstrate why the judgment was nonetheless in error. 
Laura, for example, faults the affidavit of Gentry, which alleges that he came 
to Utah to visit his mother several times between 1992-1998 (because he did not give 
specific dates), but always returned to live with his father in Nevada. (Appellant's 
Brief p. 21.) Laura would have this Court accept the facts of her affidavit and ignore 
the facts of Gentry's affidavit; however, on appeal she must demonstrate that even if 
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all the facts are as the trial court found them to be, nonetheless, there is a fatal flaw 
and they are insufficient to support the decision. Because Laura has failed to marshal 
the evidence she should not be heard to argue the trial court's factual finding is in 
error. 
IV 
Compound interest is not allowable 
Laura claims Brent never submitted an accounting of the amount due; however, 
the spreadsheet is attached to the initial judgment. (R. 555.)3 The principal difference 
in the computation is that Laura compounded interest. Laura claims her spreadsheet 
accurately sets forth the amount she is due. Her spreadsheet adds the unpaid interest 
into the principal balance annually and then calculates interest on that balance. 
Laura's computation is calculating compound interest, which is not allowed. Watkins 
& Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616(Utah 1979) (per curiam); accord Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,555 (Utah App. 1989). 
V 
New provisions of Title 78 should be applied retroactively here. 
During the year 2000, the Utah legislature enacted changes to Title 78 Chapter 
3
 A portion of the spreadsheet was apparently misfiled. The entire spreadsheet 
is annexed hereto as exhibit UA" 
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45, which are inconsistent with the provisions relied on by Laura and the cases she 
cited. She (and those cases) rely on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6, which provided that 
child support orders could not be retroactively modified. That section, however, was 
renumbered as § 78-45-9.3(4). 2000 Utah Laws ch. 161, § 27, (effective. May 1, 
2000). In that same bill, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4, which 
states "the parent without physical custody of a child shall be required to pay the 
amount of support determined in accordance with Sections 78-45-7.7 and 78-45-7.15, 
without the need to modify the order for: (a) the parent who has physical custody of 
the child." Id. (emphasis added). 
The two provisions conflict because section 4.4 provides that there is no need 
to modify the support order in a case such as this; Section 9.3, however, provides that 
there may be no retroactive modification of a support order without a petition to 
modify having been filed and served. As section 4.4 is the later enactment, it should 
control and the cases cited by Laura, which were based upon the provisions of § 30-3-
10.6 (renumbered as 78-45-9.3) must be suspect. 
Brent recognizes, as he must, that as a general rule statutes are not applied 
retroactively. "A long-standing rule of statutory construction is that we do not apply 
retroactively legislative enactments that alter substantive law or affect vested rights 
unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre 
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Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998). However, there is an exception for 
procedural statutes or amendments which clarify statutes. Id. citing Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995). 
Procedural law "prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal 
machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made 
effective." Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205,192 P.2d 589,594 (1948); see 
also Roark, 893 P.2d at 1062. In contrast, substantive law "creates, 
defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties which may give 
rise to a cause of action." Petty, 192 P.2d at 593. 
Id. 
Section 4.4 is just such a procedural statute. As has been discussed previously, 
a claim for past due child support belongs exclusively to the person who provided 
support. Neither the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-4.4, nor §78-45-9.3 
change that portion of the substantive law, rather the change codifies the existing 
common law as established by this court. 
What the statute does is change the procedural necessity of filing a petition to 
modify to ask for a modification, which was this Court's prior interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6, since renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9.3. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly rendered judgment in favor of the Laura for child 
support due for Kelly until emancipation and for Gentry only up to April 1992. There 
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was no abuse of discretion. There was substantial evidentiary support for the trial 
court's estoppel ruling. Appellee should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees. 
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